A1 Journal article (refereed)
Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection (2022)

Stajnrod, R., Ben Yehuda, R., & Zaidenberg, N. J. (2022). Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection. Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, 18(3), 259-269. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-021-00413-y

JYU authors or editors

Publication details

All authors or editors: Stajnrod, Ron; Ben Yehuda, Raz; Zaidenberg, Nezer Jacob

Journal or series: Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques

eISSN: 2263-8733

Publication year: 2022

Publication date: 20/12/2021

Volume: 18

Issue number: 3

Pages range: 259-269

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Publication country: France

Publication language: English

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-021-00413-y

Publication open access: Openly available

Publication channel open access: Partially open access channel

Publication is parallel published (JYX): https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/79482

Abstract

ARM TrustZone offers a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) embedded into the processor cores. Some vendors offer ARM modules that do not fully comply with TrustZone specifications, which may lead to vulnerabilities in the system. In this paper, we present a DMA attack tutorial from the insecure world onto the secure world, and the design and implementation of this attack in a real insecure hardware.

Keywords: data security; ubiquitous computing; Internet of things; cyber attacks; vulnerability

Free keywords: TrustZone; security

Contributing organizations

Ministry reporting: Yes

Reporting Year: 2022