A1 Journal article (refereed)
Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection (2022)


Stajnrod, R., Ben Yehuda, R., & Zaidenberg, N. J. (2022). Attacking TrustZone on devices lacking memory protection. Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, 18(3), 259-269. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-021-00413-y


JYU authors or editors


Publication details

All authors or editorsStajnrod, Ron; Ben Yehuda, Raz; Zaidenberg, Nezer Jacob

Journal or seriesJournal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques

eISSN2263-8733

Publication year2022

Publication date20/12/2021

Volume18

Issue number3

Pages range259-269

PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC

Publication countryFrance

Publication languageEnglish

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-021-00413-y

Publication open accessOpenly available

Publication channel open accessPartially open access channel

Publication is parallel published (JYX)https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/79482


Abstract

ARM TrustZone offers a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) embedded into the processor cores. Some vendors offer ARM modules that do not fully comply with TrustZone specifications, which may lead to vulnerabilities in the system. In this paper, we present a DMA attack tutorial from the insecure world onto the secure world, and the design and implementation of this attack in a real insecure hardware.


Keywordsdata securityubiquitous computingInternet of thingscyber attacksvulnerability

Free keywordsTrustZone; security


Contributing organizations


Ministry reportingYes

Reporting Year2022

JUFO rating1


Last updated on 2024-30-04 at 17:36