A1 Journal article (refereed)
Shame, Love, and Morality (2022)

Westerlund, F. (2022). Shame, Love, and Morality. Journal of Ethics, 26(4), 517-541. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-022-09402-9

JYU authors or editors

Westerlund, Fredrik

Publication details

All authors or editors: Westerlund, Fredrik

Journal or series: Journal of Ethics

ISSN: 1382-4554

eISSN: 1572-8609

Publication year: 2022

Publication date: 01/09/2022

Volume: 26

Issue number: 4

Pages range: 517-541

Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Publication country: Netherlands

Publication language: English

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-022-09402-9

Publication open access: Openly available

Publication channel open access: Partially open access channel

Publication is parallel published (JYX): https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/83141

Abstract

This article offers a new account of the moral substance of shame. Through careful reflection on the motives and intentional structure of shame, I defend the claim that shame is an egocentric and morally blind emotion. I argue that shame is rooted in our desire for social affirmation and constituted by our ability to sense how we appear to others. What makes shame egocentric is that in shame we are essentially concerned about our own social worth and pained by the perception of our self as socially worthless. In itself, shame entails no morally pertinent concern about others or understanding of what is morally significant. I contrast shame with the possibility of relating to others—and to oneself—with love and care. Indeed, I propose that love is essential for moral understanding and motivation. The argument of the article unfolds through critical appraisals of the main strategies for defending the moral value of shame. First, against the claim that shame entails respect for others, I argue that shame's sensitivity to the opinions of others is motivated by egocentric self-concern. Second, against the view that shame over failures to live up to moral values is morally valuable, I argue that regardless of whether the values guiding our shame are moral or not, the perspective of shame is oblivious to their moral meaning. Third, against the claim that shame is crucial for self-understanding, I argue that the desire for affirmation that drives shame is a powerful source of self-deception.

Keywords: shame; appreciation; morals; introspection; love; phenomenology; emotions