G4 Doctoral dissertation (monograph)
Investigating the other side of agency : a cross-disciplinary approach to intentional omissions (2019)
Kärki, K. (2019). Investigating the other side of agency : a cross-disciplinary approach to intentional omissions [Doctoral dissertation]. Jyväskylän yliopisto. JYU dissertations, 65. http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-39-7695-8
JYU authors or editors
Publication details
All authors or editors: Kärki, Kaisa
eISBN: 978-951-39-7695-8
Journal or series: JYU dissertations
eISSN: 2489-9003
Publication year: 2019
Number in series: 65
Number of pages in the book: 1 verkkoaineisto (134 sivua) :
Publisher: Jyväskylän yliopisto
Place of Publication: Jyväskylä
Publication country: Finland
Publication language: English
Persistent website address: http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-39-7695-8
Publication open access: Openly available
Publication channel open access: Open Access channel
Abstract
systematically address intentional omissions of agents, including those that are about
resisting the action not done. I argue that even though philosophy of agency has largely
concentrated on the actions of agents, when applying philosophy of action to the social
sciences, a full-blown theoretical account of what agents do not do and a non-normative
conceptual language of the phenomena in question is needed.
Chapter 2 aims to find out what kind of things intentional omissions are. I argue that
although intentional omissions are part of our intentional behavior, they are not actions in
the sense that the standard account of action assumes. Instead, because intentional omissions
are homogenous, continuous, unbounded, indefinite and directly uncountable, they should
be thought of as activities instead of performances. This view links the ontology of
intentional omissions to the ontology of processes instead of to that of events, and I argue
that this kind of ontology accounts for the fluid nature of the agency of alive agents not only
instigating but controlling and sustaining their intentional omissions as well.
Chapter 3 aims to find out on what conditions is an omission intentional. The aim is to find
a naturalized explanation of them that would make it possible to combine psychological
perspectives with philosophical ones so that intentional omissions could be treated as
something that exist in the world, not just in our philosophical intuitions. I argue that
intentional omissions necessarily require the agent’s procedural metacognition concerning
the action not done. Based on this metacognition view, a non-normative conceptual typology
of not doings is presented.
Chapter 4 aims to find out on what conditions is an intentional omissions resistance toward
something. The necessary elements of resistance are clarified and I argue that resistant
intentional omissions in which the agent does not perform an action out of resistance toward
something are a normal part of our everyday agency. The implications of the findings are
considered for theories of action, especially when it comes to the belief-desire model that may
not be able to fully account for resistant intentional omissions.
Chapter 5 aims to find out what conceptual means do we have for talking about not doing
something as a form of resistance. I argue that in the social sciences, bioethics and military ethics
to not do something out of resistance is taken as something that exists, and as something that
has causes and effects. However, concepts such as civil disobedience, conscientious refusing,
exit and everyday resistance do not account for the ordinariness of this kind of not doings.
Thus, I argue that such concepts are not able to fully cover resistant inaction and philosophy
of intentional omissions can be of use not just in the social sciences.
Finally, Chapter 6 considers the implications of these findings. The main implication of
this study is that our view of social and ethical agency would need to better include
intentional not doings, not just the sum of the intentional actions of agents. Another major
implication is that agents themselves should be heard when analyzing their intentional
omissions in society, because intentional omissions are phenomena that can easily be mixed
with the passivities of agents from the perspective of an outside observer.
Keywords: doctoral dissertations; processes; events; intentionality; human agency; resistance (politics); metacognition
Free keywords: intentional omissions; activity; process; event; intentionality; agency; resistance; metacognition
Contributing organizations
Ministry reporting: Yes
Reporting Year: 2019
