A1 Journal article (refereed)
Incentive Mechanism for Edge-Computing-Based Blockchain (2020)
Chang, Z., Guo, W., Guo, X., Zhou, Z., & Ristaniemi, T. (2020). Incentive Mechanism for Edge-Computing-Based Blockchain. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 16(11), 7105-7114. https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2020.2973248
JYU authors or editors
Publication details
All authors or editors: Chang, Zheng; Guo, Wenlong; Guo, Xijuan; Zhou, Zhenyu; Ristaniemi, Tapani
Journal or series: IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
ISSN: 1551-3203
eISSN: 1941-0050
Publication year: 2020
Volume: 16
Issue number: 11
Pages range: 7105-7114
Publisher: IEEE
Publication country: United States
Publication language: English
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/TII.2020.2973248
Publication open access: Not open
Publication channel open access:
Publication is parallel published (JYX): https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/71307
Abstract
Blockchain has been gradually applied to different Internet of Things (IoT) platforms. As the efficiency of the blockchain mainly depends on the network computing capability, how to make sure the acquisition of the computational resources and participation of the devices would be the driving force. In this work, we focus on investigating incentive mechanism for rational miners to purchase the computational resources. A edge computing-based blockchain network is considered, where the edge service provider (ESP) can provide computational resources for the miners. Accordingly, we formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game between the miners and ESP. The aim is to investigate Stackelberg equilibrium of the optimal mining strategy under the two different mining schemes, in order to find the optimal incentive for the ESP and miners to choose auto-fit strategies. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, we can demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme on encouraging devices to participate the blockchain.
Keywords: blockchains; data mining; optimisation; game theory
Free keywords: blockchain; hash power; mining; computing; reporting; reward; Nash equilibrium; optimal incentive
Contributing organizations
Ministry reporting: Yes
Reporting Year: 2020
JUFO rating: 3
