A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä
High cooperation and welfare despite — and because of — the threat of antisocial punishments and feuds (2021)

Gordon, D. S., & Puurtinen, M. (2021). High cooperation and welfare despite — and because of — the threat of antisocial punishments and feuds. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150(7), 1373-1386. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001004

JYU-tekijät tai -toimittajat

Puurtinen, Mikael

Julkaisun tiedot

Julkaisun kaikki tekijät tai toimittajat: Gordon, David S.; Puurtinen, Mikael

Lehti tai sarja: Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

ISSN: 0096-3445

eISSN: 1939-2222

Julkaisuvuosi: 2021

Ilmestymispäivä: 30.11.2020

Volyymi: 150

Lehden numero: 7

Artikkelin sivunumerot: 1373-1386

Kustantaja: American Psychological Association

Julkaisumaa: Yhdysvallat (USA)

Julkaisun kieli: englanti

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001004

Julkaisun avoin saatavuus: Ei avoin

Julkaisukanavan avoin saatavuus:

Julkaisu on rinnakkaistallennettu (JYX): https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/73753

Tiivistelmä

Cooperation can be difficult to sustain when there is a temptation to free-ride on the efforts of others. In experiments, peer punishment often stabilizes cooperation but fails to improve earnings because of the costs associated with punishment. In addition, antisocial use of punishment—punishing cooperators, counterpunishing, and feuding—often leads to lower cooperation and earnings. The current study investigated if powerful individuals—individuals who can punish without cost or who are immune from punishment—police the antisocial use of punishment, thus reducing the undesirable effects of punishment. In order to create ample opportunities for antisocial punishment and identify the motives for the use of punishment, our modified public goods game implemented fixed groups, fixed participant identifiers, 2 punishment stages, and full information about participant actions. The powerful participants with cost-free punishment or immunity punished low contributors more often, and immune participants also punished those who punished cooperators. Intriguingly, we found that whenever all participants could be punished—regardless of the cost of punishing or asymmetry in the cost—cooperation and net earnings reached very high levels. However, participants who were immune cooperated at a markedly low level, reducing earnings in the group. The results show that in an environment with repeated interactions, plenty of information, and everyone being accountable, even inefficient punishment can maintain high cooperation and earnings, but immunity of the powerful leads to corrupt behavior and reduced efficiency.

YSO-asiasanat: evoluutiopsykologia; sosiaalinen käyttäytyminen; yhteistyö; rangaistukset

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