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On Common Sense, Estimation, and the Soul’s Unity in Avicenna (2020)

Kaukua, J. (2020). On Common Sense, Estimation, and the Soul’s Unity in Avicenna. In D. Bennett, & J. Toivanen (Eds.), Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception : Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism (pp. 151-160). Springer. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 26. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56946-4_8

JYU-tekijät tai -toimittajat

Kaukua, Jari

Julkaisun tiedot

Julkaisun kaikki tekijät tai toimittajat: Kaukua, Jari

Emojulkaisu: Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception : Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism

Emojulkaisun toimittajat: Bennett, David; Toivanen, Juhana

ISBN: 978-3-030-56945-7

eISBN: 978-3-030-56946-4

Lehti tai sarja: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind

ISSN: 1573-5834

eISSN: 2542-9922

Julkaisuvuosi: 2020

Sarjan numero: 26

Artikkelin sivunumerot: 151-160

Kirjan kokonaissivumäärä: 258

Kustantaja: Springer

Kustannuspaikka: Cham

Julkaisumaa: Sveitsi

Julkaisun kieli: englanti

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56946-4_8

Julkaisun avoin saatavuus: Ei avoin

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Julkaisu on rinnakkaistallennettu (JYX): https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/74604

Tiivistelmä

This paper addresses two questions related to Themistius’ alleged influence on Avicenna’s theory of the common sense. The first question concerns the phenomenon of incidental perception, which Themistius explained by means of the common sense. For Avicenna, on the contrary, the explanation of cases like our perceiving something yellow as honey involves the faculty of estimation and the entire system of the internal senses that he coined, and this results in an analysis that is considerably more complex than Themistius’. The second question concerns Themistius’ claim according to which an incorporeal spirit is the primary subject of perception. I argue that Avicenna departs from such a view both because for him spirit is a corporeal substance and because he insists that the subject of all cognition is the soul, not any of its faculties. Finally, I conclude by briefly considering other, more general ways in which Themistius could have influenced Avicenna’s psychology.

YSO-asiasanat: mielenfilosofia; havainnot; aistit; terve järki; sielu; arabialainen filosofia

Vapaat asiasanat: Avicenna; Themistius

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