A3 Book section, Chapters in research books
On Common Sense, Estimation, and the Soul’s Unity in Avicenna (2020)

Kaukua, J. (2020). On Common Sense, Estimation, and the Soul’s Unity in Avicenna. In D. Bennett, & J. Toivanen (Eds.), Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception : Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism (pp. 151-160). Springer. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 26. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56946-4_8

JYU authors or editors

Kaukua, Jari

Publication details

All authors or editors: Kaukua, Jari

Parent publication: Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception : Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism

Parent publication editors: Bennett, David; Toivanen, Juhana

ISBN: 978-3-030-56945-7

eISBN: 978-3-030-56946-4

Journal or series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind

ISSN: 1573-5834

eISSN: 2542-9922

Publication year: 2020

Number in series: 26

Pages range: 151-160

Number of pages in the book: 258

Publisher: Springer

Place of Publication: Cham

Publication country: Switzerland

Publication language: English

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56946-4_8

Publication open access: Not open

Publication channel open access:

Publication is parallel published (JYX): https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/74604

Abstract

This paper addresses two questions related to Themistius’ alleged influence on Avicenna’s theory of the common sense. The first question concerns the phenomenon of incidental perception, which Themistius explained by means of the common sense. For Avicenna, on the contrary, the explanation of cases like our perceiving something yellow as honey involves the faculty of estimation and the entire system of the internal senses that he coined, and this results in an analysis that is considerably more complex than Themistius’. The second question concerns Themistius’ claim according to which an incorporeal spirit is the primary subject of perception. I argue that Avicenna departs from such a view both because for him spirit is a corporeal substance and because he insists that the subject of all cognition is the soul, not any of its faculties. Finally, I conclude by briefly considering other, more general ways in which Themistius could have influenced Avicenna’s psychology.

Keywords: philosophy of mind; perceptions (mental objects); senses; common sense; soul; Arabic philosophy

Free keywords: Avicenna; Themistius

Fields of science: