A3 Book section, Chapters in research books
On Common Sense, Estimation, and the Soul’s Unity in Avicenna (2020)
Kaukua, J. (2020). On Common Sense, Estimation, and the Soul’s Unity in Avicenna. In D. Bennett, & J. Toivanen (Eds.), Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception : Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism (pp. 151-160). Springer. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 26. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56946-4_8
JYU authors or editors
Publication details
All authors or editors: Kaukua, Jari
Parent publication: Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception : Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism
Parent publication editors: Bennett, David; Toivanen, Juhana
ISBN: 978-3-030-56945-7
eISBN: 978-3-030-56946-4
Journal or series: Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind
ISSN: 1573-5834
eISSN: 2542-9922
Publication year: 2020
Number in series: 26
Pages range: 151-160
Number of pages in the book: 258
Publisher: Springer
Place of Publication: Cham
Publication country: Switzerland
Publication language: English
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56946-4_8
Publication open access: Not open
Publication channel open access:
Publication is parallel published (JYX): https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/74604
Abstract
This paper addresses two questions related to Themistius’ alleged influence on Avicenna’s theory of the common sense. The first question concerns the phenomenon of incidental perception, which Themistius explained by means of the common sense. For Avicenna, on the contrary, the explanation of cases like our perceiving something yellow as honey involves the faculty of estimation and the entire system of the internal senses that he coined, and this results in an analysis that is considerably more complex than Themistius’. The second question concerns Themistius’ claim according to which an incorporeal spirit is the primary subject of perception. I argue that Avicenna departs from such a view both because for him spirit is a corporeal substance and because he insists that the subject of all cognition is the soul, not any of its faculties. Finally, I conclude by briefly considering other, more general ways in which Themistius could have influenced Avicenna’s psychology.
Keywords: philosophy of mind; perceptions (mental objects); senses; common sense; soul; Arabic philosophy
Free keywords: Avicenna; Themistius
Contributing organizations
Ministry reporting: Yes
Reporting Year: 2020
JUFO rating: 2
Parent publication with JYU authors: